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RECENT DECISIONS 
AGENCY-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR TERMINATION OF AGENTS EMPLOY-
MENT-In the summer of 1949, appellant entered into an oral1 contract for 
an indefinite time with the appellee whereby the former was granted an 
exclusive wholesale distributorship of appellee's farm and garden equip-
ment. A four-year period followed in which appellant increased the num-
ber of dealers in appellee's product from four or five in 1949 to over one 
hundred in 1953. In the latter part of 1952 appellant contemplated an 
enlargement of its facilities which would require it to enter upon a fifteen-
year lease. Since the lessor desired some assurances as to the duration of 
appellant's franchise, appellant wrote to appellee asking for such assurance 
and setting forth the intended lease arrangement. In its reply, appellee 
gave no definite assurance of the permanency of the distributorship ar-
rangement, but did express its belief in a continuation of the relationship. 
Appellant executed the lease. In September 1953 appellant undertook to 
sell equipment that appellee considered to be in competition with its prod-
ucts. The distributorship contract was canceled, and appellee took over 
the territory and distributed its products through many of the dealerships 
that had been established by the appellant. Appellee sued to collect on an 
open account, and appellant counterclaimed for damages for unlawful 
cancellation of its contract. A jury awarded appellant damages, but the 
district court rendered judgment n.o.v. for the appellee.2 On appeal, held, 
reversed and remanded for jury determination. The manufacturer may not 
terminate the agreement at will, even though the contract contains no 
provision for its termination, but must retain the agent in employment for 
a reasonable period of time. Allied Equipment Co. v. Weber Engineered 
Products, (4th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 879. 
The principal case is concerned, not with the manufacturer's power to 
revoke the agent's authority, but with his right to do so under the agency 
contract. Unless the contract gives the principal the right to revoke, his 
act of terminating the agency, though effective to end the relationship, will 
nevertheless subject the principal to liability for breach of contract. Ac-
cording to the general rule, when a contract designates that one party shall 
act as the agent of another but does not set out a definite time or prescribe 
conditions for determining the duration of the relationship, the contract 
may be terminated, without liability, by either party at will.3 Cases folio~-
1 Though the question of the statute of frauds was not raised in the principal case, 
courts have held that since the contract might be fully performed within one year by the 
death of the appellant, the statute of frauds has no application. Warner v. Texas & Pacific 
Ry. Co., 164 U.S. 418 (1896); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Bobo, (9th Cir. 1925) 4 F. 
(2d) 71. 
2 Farm and Garden Sales v. Allied Equipment Co., (E.D. Va. 1956) 138 F. Supp. 317. 
3 Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 368 Pa. 448, 84 A. (2d) 323 (1951); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Kirkmeyer Motor Co., (4th Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 1001; Motor Car Supply Co. v. General 
Household Utilities Co., (4th Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 167. 
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ing the general rule usually treat the contract as unenforceable because of 
indefiniteness and want of mutuality.4 Thus, for the purpose of a suit for 
damages, the agent is said to have no contract. These questions of vague-
ness and mutuality were not raised in the principal case, however, for the 
parties assumed that there was some contractual arrangement. The prin-
cipal case may be compared more appropriately with the decisions of the 
courts which, departing from the general rule, have recognized the existence 
of a contract in this situation. Some of the courts that treat the contract as 
valid avoid the problem of uncertainty by construing contracts prescribing 
no definite time limitation as terminable after a reasonable time has 
elapsed.5 The rationale of these decisions is primarily the fictitious con-
ception that the parties intended a reasonable time in which to fulfill their 
contractual arrangement. The principal case, however, does not rely on 
fictitious intent to immunize the agent from the impact of the general rule. 
Rather, it applies, as an exception to the general rule, the principle that 
when an agent, in reliance upon his agency and with the knowledge of the 
principal, expends funds in the interest of the agency and of the principal, 
the principal must allow the agency to continue for a reasonable period of 
time so that the agent may recoup his expenditures. By furnishing a con-
sideration in addition to his mere services, the. agent is deemed to have 
purchased his employment for a time long enough to allow the agent to 
regain his investment.6 This is the view taken by the Agency Restatement7 
and by Professor Williston.8 This consideration theory relied on in the 
principal case was expressed in an earlier decision of the same court in 
Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks,9 where on similar facts the court held for the 
agent. The theory of the principal case offers little help in predicting the 
outcome of future cases, since it leaves several problems to be decided case 
by case. In the first place, it is difficult to distinguish between the agent's 
primary job of distributing and the "additional consideration" he fur-
nishes in establishing a system for distributing. This difficulty is evidenced 
by the fact that other courts, on like facts, have found that the agent pro-
4 E.g., Curtis Candy Co. v. Silberman, (6th Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 451; Willard, Suther-
land &: Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489 (1923); Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., (7th Cir. 
1935) 75 F. (2d) 447. These cases hold that the contract in question only resulted in a 
contract for a series of independent sales. 1 CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT §32 (1932): "An offer 
must be so definite in its terms, or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the 
promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain." 
5 E.g., Abrams v. George E. Keith Co., (3d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 90; Boehm v. Spreckels, 
183 Cal. 239, 191 P. 5 (1920); Elson &: Co. v. Beselin &: Son, 116 Neb. 729, 218 N.W. 753 
(1928). 
6Accord: Beebe v. The Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212, 117 S.W. (2d) 624 
(1938); Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, (4th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 935; Ansbacker-Siegle 
Corp. v. Miller Chemical Co., 137 Neb. 142, 288 N.W. 538 (1939); Bassick Mfg. Co. v. 
Riley, (E.D. Pa. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 138; Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Bobo, note I supra; 
J. C. Millett Co. v. Park&: Tilford Distillers Corp., (N.D. Cal. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 484. 
7 2 AGENCY R.EsTATEMENT §442, comment c (1933). 
8 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1027A (3) (1936). 
9 Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, note 6 supra. 
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vided no consideration beyond, the services necessary to perform his duties.10 
Another difficult question concerns the· reasonableness of the agent's acts 
in supplying the additional consideration. The agent must act reasonably 
in relying upon the agreement11 and in making costly expenditures. In 
the principal case the agent had requested assurances from the principal 
concerning the durability of the relationship and received in reply only 
vague and general statements relating to the principal's hope that the ar-
rangement would continue. It is arguable that a prudent businessman 
would not rely upon such generalities in consummating a fifteen-year lease, 
particularly when assurances were pointedly asked for and were not re-
ceived. A further perplexing problem is that of determining what period 
actually constitutes a reasonable time in which the agent may recoup his 
investment. The agent is likely to be continuously making investments so 
that at no one period of time may it be said that he recouped his entire 
expenditures. Moreover, the agent may argue plausibly that the agreement 
must be continued for a considerable length of time on the ground that the 
first years of the agreement are merely the foundation for future remunera-
tive years.12 
William G. Mateer, S.Ed. 
10 Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., note 3 supra; Superior Concrete Accessories v. 
Kemper, (Mo. 1955) 284 S.W. (2d) 482. 
11 Grimes v. Baker, 133 Neb. 517,275 N.W. 860 (1937). 
12 Superior Concrete Accessories v. Kemper, note IO supra. 
